Artificial Cognitive Systems that can answer Human Creativity Tests : An Approach and Two Case Studies by Olteteanu, Ana-Maria
2379-8920 (c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TCDS.2016.2629622, IEEE
Transactions on Cognitive and Developmental Systems
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COGNITIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS 1
Artiﬁcial Cognitive Systems that can
answer Human Creativity Tests: An Approach
and Two Case Studies
Ana-Maria Oltet¸eanu, Zoe Falomir, Christian Freksa
Bremen Spatial Cognition Center, Universita¨t Bremen
Abstract—Creative cognitive systems are rarely assessed with
the same tools as human creativity. In this paper, an approach
is proposed for building cognitive systems which can solve
human creativity tests. The importance of using cognitively viable
processes, cognitive knowledge acquisition and organization, and
cognitively comparable evaluation when implementing creative
problem-solving systems is emphasized. Two case studies of arti-
ﬁcial cognitive systems evaluated with human creativity tests are
reviewed. A general approach is put forward. The applicability
of this general approach to other creativity tests and artiﬁcial
cognitive systems, together with ways of performing cognitive
knowledge acquisition for these systems are then explored.
Index Terms—Computational Creativity, Human Creativity,
Cognitive Systems, Cognitive Processing, Cognitive Knowledge
Acquisition, Cognitively-comparable Evaluation
I. INTRODUCTION
WE envision a future where cognitive agents help hu-mans solve problems in their daily routines at home
and at work. In order to be helpful, those agents must ﬁnd good
solutions or creative alternatives the human can select from.
Imagine you are in your house, needing to solve a particular
problem. You need a particular tool or object (e.g. a piece of
string) or recipe ingredient (e.g. mince meat) but you do not
have it in the house. You would like to solve your problem
using a different tool, object or ingredient, and have a system
show you what you could use instead (e.g. dental ﬂoss to
replace the piece of string, aubergine to replace the mince
meat - depending on task and recipe context).
Or imagine you are in a situation in which you ran out of
ideas on how to solve a particular problem, and would like to
think of a completely different approach. Let us say that you
would like the help of a system that could inspire you. Such
a system would need to operate or at least communicate in
a cognitive manner – understand what type of information is
associated with the problem at hand, in a manner that would
enhance your creative process – for example by predisposing
you to new ways of seeing the problem or re-representing its
content. It could show you items (websites, research articles,
excerpts from encyclopedias, music, ﬁlms, photos, formulas)
which could trigger for you new associations, new ways of
solving or framing that problem.
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Furthermore, such assistive systems would need to be capa-
ble of creative problem-solving and of presenting their results
in a manner that can easily be used as input by humans.
They would need to be endowed with cognitive knowledge
acquisition, and types of knowledge processing which are akin
to those used by humans in their creative problem-solving.
Computational creativity is a strongly emerging ﬁeld in
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, with application systems ranging from
poetry [1], music [2], painting [3] to mathematics [4]. Em-
pirical tests of human creativity and creative problem-solving
do exist [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. However, computational
creativity systems can rarely be assessed in a comparable
manner, i.e. by using human creativity tests. This has as
consequence the fact that not many artiﬁcial cognitive systems
which can be used as cognitive models exist (e.g. [11]), and
thus not as much progress is made as possible in terms of
understanding the cognitive bases of the creative process, and
in building artiﬁcial cognitive creative systems.
This paper argues that (i) artiﬁcial cognitive systems can
be used to shed light on the human creative process and (ii)
knowledge obtained from creativity tests can be used to inform
and evaluate artiﬁcial cognitive systems, if more work is done
on artiﬁcial cognitive systems that can be assessed with human
creativity tests. To support this claim, this paper presents
a general approach for building artiﬁcial cognitive systems
that can solve human creativity tests in a cognitive manner.
The types of knowledge, knowledge acquisition, cognitive
processes and cognitive evaluation which can be used are also
discussed. The beneﬁts of bridging this gap are then shown in
terms of (a) new relations which can be observed or studied
from a cognitive modeling paradigm and (b) knowledge and
data obtained from human creativity tests which can then be
used to inform artiﬁcial cognitive systems. Two case studies
of systems which can solve human creativity tests are then
presented, brieﬂy describing how cognitive knowledge was
acquired and organized for such systems, the processes used
and how the systems were evaluated compared to their human
counterparts.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section
II describes the differences between computational creativity
evaluation methods and human creative evaluation. Cognitive
processes relevant when implementing artiﬁcial creative cog-
nitive systems are discussed in Section III. Sections IV-A and
IV-B brieﬂy describe two case studies of artiﬁcial cognitive
systems which can give comparable results to humans in cre-
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ativity tests, together with the knowledge acquisition, cognitive
processing and evaluation of these systems. Section V presents
a general approach towards making artiﬁcial cognitive systems
that yield comparable results to humans in creativity tests.
The applicability of this approach to other creativity tests is
discussed in Section VI.
A short description of how cognitive knowledge acquisition
can be performed using creativity tests is provided in section
VII. A short discussion and conclusion is presented in Section
VIII.
II. COMPUTATIONAL CREATIVITY EVALUATION VERSUS
HUMAN CREATIVITY TESTS
Computational creativity is evaluated in various ways and
it has been debated what the evaluation process for computa-
tional creativity systems should be [12], [13]. Some authors
aim to produce artefacts through their systems, and would
like them to be assessed as having comparable creativity to
that of humans. Others deﬁne creativity in terms of process
[14], not necessarily aiming for an implementation. Ritchie
[13] proposed an assessment of computational creative systems
which takes into account the inspiring set – a union of implicit
and explicit knowledge – formalizing 14 criteria of evaluation,
centered around typicality, quality and novelty (see also [15]).
Pease, Winterstein and Colton [16] proposed an evaluation
which takes into account the input, output and process of
the creative system, based on measures of novelty, quality
and process. The FACE model [17] describes creative acts
as tuples of generative acts, including items and methods of
producing items in four categories: concepts, concept expres-
sions, aesthetic measures and framing information. The IDEA
model [17] uses the notion of the impact a creation has,
rather than that of creation value, and suggests six stages of
development of a computational creativity system, based on
the difference between the information given as knowledge to
the system and the artefacts it generates. Other authors use
human evaluation (e.g. Williams and McOwan [18]), asking
users to rate the products of computational creativity systems,
or to choose words which appropriately describe their reaction
to those products. Yet other thoughts on evaluation can be
seen in the move against mere generation commented upon
by Ventura [19], Jordanous’ SPECS methodology [20], the
discussion on creativity versus the perception of creativity and
Colton’s creative tripod [21], etc.
Although the ﬁeld of computational creativity evaluation
has made signiﬁcant progress, none of the types of evaluation
above shines a bright light on cognitive creative processing.
Some steps in the direction of human cognition are being
made, with some research addressing human tasks [22], and
models being based on a psychological theory of communica-
tive interaction [23].
On the other disciplinary side of creativity studies – that
of human cognition – human creative problem-solving, or
processes considered to take part in it (like divergent thought),
are evaluated with various creativity tasks. Some of these are
the following:
• The Remote Associates Test [5];
• The Alternative Uses Test [6];
• The Torrance Creativity Tests (reviewed by Kim [7]);
• The Wallach-Kogan tests [8];
• Insight tests (like the ones described by [9], [10])
The human responses in such tasks are generally evaluated
in terms of various groups of the following metrics. Some
of these metrics assess a particular expected correct answer,
others are used for assessing open-ended answers.
1) Success: achieving or not achieving a solution (this
metric is particularly useful for hard insight tasks).
2) Response time for a particular solution.
3) Difﬁculty of solving a particular problem item as a
percentage of the population solving it.
4) Fluency - in open-ended tests, measures how many
different items the participant has come up with as an
answer).
5) Flexibility - measures how many semantically different
domains the answers to a particular item cover.
6) Elaboration - assesses the amount of detail contained in
the various answers.
7) Originality - responses given by a small percentage of
the participants are rated as unusual.
8) Novelty - human judges are asked to assess answers
given by human participants on a novelty scale (used
for the Alternative Uses Test [6], the Wallach-Kogan
test [8]). One can then check for the validity of the
novelty judgement by exploring the agreement between
the assessments of the various judges.
Furthermore, the literature addressing these tests sheds
insight into the cognitive processing behind such tasks.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF COGNITIVE PROCESSING IN
CREATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING SYSTEMS
Various cognitive processes are said to account for creative
problem-solving, with one of the most modeled processes
being analogy (with models like ANALOGY [24], MAC/FAC
[25], LISA [26], STAR [27], Copycat [28], etc.). Another
creative process which has recently gathered investigative
interest is that of conceptual blending [29]. Concept blending
is deﬁned by Fauconnier [29] as a basic mental operation of
constructing a partial match between two inputs, projecting
selectively from those inputs into a “blended space” which
has as a result the emergence of a new structure and of new
meaning. The COINVENT project investigated and computa-
tionally instantiated this process [30]. Various theories account
for insight problem-solving [31]: for example, this type of
problem solving is assumed to include four stages – Prepa-
ration, Incubation, Illumination or Insight and Veriﬁcation or
Evaluation. An important process which is considered part
of insightful problem solving is that of re-representation. In
order to build artiﬁcial cognitive creative agents, one can use
this literature to build computational mechanisms akin to the
cognitive processes involved in solving creativity tasks. In the
authors’opinion [32], the cognitive processes of association,
use of similarity, structure, and re-representation are to be
always kept in mind.
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Associations are important in creative problem-solving due
to their ability to bring new material into the problem space for
the solver. Creative problem spaces are ambiguous and there-
fore can beneﬁt from ﬂuidity. Associations can easily be made
based on similarity or context, as follows. Associations can
be made by context, as encountering certain items (a, b, c, d)
constantly together generally produces the cognitive result of
triggering the other items (like c and/or d) when some of the
items (a, b) have been shown. Associations can be made by
similarity, as similarity of features might imply similarity of
affordance (e.g. if you know you can kick footballs, you might
want to try playing in the same way with any spherical object
of similar weight and material).
All such processes can help bring more useful items into
the problem space and allow re-representation. Knowledge of
structure can allow structure-mapping into different domains
[33], replacement of structure parts [34], navigation between
similar structures, and structure-based operations (merging,
overlap, removal of unnecessary parts, etc.) [32]. These allow
further ways of using old knowledge creatively in order to
produce new, useful and interesting knowledge.
Such cognitive processes need to be replicated in artiﬁcial
cognitive systems in order to: a) enable them to assist humans
in processes of re-representation and creative problem-solving,
and b) explain their own creative productions in ways which
make sense to humans. An initial requirement in replicating
and reﬁning such processes is the ability to build systems
capable of giving results comparable to humans in various
creativity tests.
IV. CASE STUDIES
This section summarizes two case studies of cognitive
systems which yield results comparable to human participants
in creativity tests. Section IV-A presents comRAT, a cognitive
system which can give comparable answers to humans in the
Remote Associates Test [35]. Section IV-B presents OROC, a
prototype system capable of giving similar answers to humans
to the Alternative Uses Test [34].
A. Case 1 - comRAT - A Remote Associates Test solver
The Remote Associates Test: The Remote Associates Test
(RAT) by Mednick and Mednick [5] is a creativity test in
which participants are given three word items and required to
produce a fourth, which is associated with all three of them
in some way. For example, the words CREAM, SKATE and
WATER are given. A correct answer to this query would be
the word ICE. Various types of RAT can be distinguished,
depending on the type of associations at play [36] - structural
or compound items reﬂect language based relationships, and
functional items reﬂect relationships beyond language.
The RAT has been widely used as an empirical measurement
of creativity [37], [38] and translated1 into multiple languages
1Translation of the RAT is not a trivial task, as a RAT item in English will
rarely translate in a RAT item in Italian, for example, as associates between
the query words and the answer might not exist, or be reasonable compounds.
In that context, a translation of the RAT generally means creating a set of
suitable items for the test in that language, and checking for the validity of
those items. The compound RAT thus depends on language and language use,
whereas the functional RAT reﬂects semantic relations within a language.
[39], [40], [41], [42].
The type of data acquired after empirical testing includes
the percentage of participants solving a particular test item and
response speed. Useful sources of normative data are available
[43].
Description of the knowledge acquisition and solving pro-
cess for the artiﬁcial cognitive system solver: A computa-
tional RAT solver (comRAT) was presented by Oltet¸eanu and
Falomir [44], [35], using language data and a convergence pro-
cess, which will further be brieﬂy summarized. The language
data used consisted of the 1, 048, 720 most frequent 2-grams
from the Corpus of Contemporary American English2. The
University of Lancaster – Constituent Likelihood Automatic
Word-tagging System (UCREL CLAWS7) tagset3 provides
grammatical tags to words in bodies of continuous text. Based
on this tagset, 205, 602 2-grams with relevant tags for the task
were kept (a complete list of the types of words kept based on
their tag is provided by [35]). The comRAT system learned
all the unique Concepts of the 2-grams, and organized bidi-
rectional Links between Concepts which appeared together
in an Expression.
When 3-word RAT queries were given to the system, if
known, the 3 Concepts were activated, together with the
Links and Concepts associatively attached to them. The
Concepts activated from most sides were considered as po-
tential answers. The activation of the initial Concepts thus
converged upon possible answers for RAT queries through an
associative process.
Description of evaluation with human data: The comRAT
system was given the 144 items from the Bowden and Jung-
Beeman [43] normative data to solve, thus being tested with
the exact same queries as humans. The computational RAT
found the correct answer provided in the normative data for
47 out of the 48 items for which it had known all 3 initial
Expression items. The system solved another 17 queries for
which it only knew 2 initial items. From a cognitive point of
view, computational systems can be used to model the human
process and obtain similar performance, rather than solve tasks
to perfection. When solving this task, comRAT is limited in its
ability to come up with an answer by its existing knowledge, as
human participants would also be. In 26 cases, comRAT comes
up with other plausible answers – for example it answers the
query MILL, TOOTH, DUST, for which the correct answer
provided by the normative data is SAW, with the plausible
answer GOLD; the query CRY, FRONT, SHIP, for which the
correct answer from the normative data is BATTLE, is given
the plausible answer WAR, etc.
Furthermore, using data on the frequency of 2-grams, the
probability of the system to ﬁnd an answer has been found to
correlate with the difﬁculty of the RAT queries for humans.
The probability to ﬁnd an answer given each query word is
calculated as the ratio of favourable cases in which the query
word and answer word appear linked together, over the total
number of cases in which the query word appears linked to all
Concepts. The initial calculation considered each query word
2http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/
3http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/claws7tags.html
2379-8920 (c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TCDS.2016.2629622, IEEE
Transactions on Cognitive and Developmental Systems
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COGNITIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS 4
to have an equal inﬂuence in determining the probability of
the answer, however this can be further modiﬁed to account
for possible order effects. Difﬁculty of query for humans was
understood to be represented in the normative data by human
response time and percentage of participants solving the query.
A signiﬁcant moderate correlation between difﬁculty of query
for humans and comRAT’s probability of ﬁnding an answer
was observed, as follows. The correlation between accuracy
and comRAT’s probability was r = 0.49, p < 0.002 for mean
solution time in 30s - thus the higher the probability, the
more accurate people were on average in answering the query.
The inverse correlation between response times and comRAT’s
probability was r = −0.52, p < 0.001 for mean solution time
in 30s - thus the higher the probability, the less time people
took on average to solve the query.
This shows that the process of association and convergence
used by comRAT to solve the task has high chances of
providing further insights into future cognitive models of the
task. As the system can come up with plausible answers
even when lacking the knowledge to respond correctly, this
demonstrates possible further uses of associative processes
in order to ensure ﬂexibility and robustness in knowledge-
based systems. The system further showed an ability to give
multiple answers to some queries – for example, to query
HIGH, DISTRICT, HOUSE, it could provide answers SCHOOL,
COURT, OFFICE, WATER and others. Answer SCHOOL (which
is also the only answer provided as correct in Bowden and
Jung-Beeman’s normative dataset) “won” via its higher prob-
ability in comRAT. This capacity for multiple answers based
on knowledge acquired from human data will further allow the
cognitive empirical study of the reasons why some answers are
preferred by humans over others, and the links between this
and frequency of known expressions.
The comRAT solver can be used to generate new RAT
queries. RAT items can thus be generated for future empirical
work with human participants, controlling for semantic tag,
position in the 2-gram of the given and answer word, fre-
quency of the various query items and probability of ﬁnding
the answer. This allows the generation of sets of RAT queries
in which different variables are kept constant, thus making
comRAT a future useful tool for the cognitive modeling
community.
The comRAT solver and its principles have also been used
to translate the RAT task to the visual domain. Though a
validation of these items is yet in the making, comRAT could
thus help examine creativity tests in a multimodal perspective
[45].
The cognitive process of association and the cognitive data
on frequency of two grams and other types of associates are
thus used to create an artiﬁcial cognitive system which has
many future possible applications in the cognitive modeling
community. Using comRAT’s ability to generate and solve
queries will provide more knowledge about how the RAT is
solved by humans, which can help improve comRAT further,
and possibly tackle a wider array of association-based tasks
in the future.
B. Case 2 - OROC - an object replacement, object composi-
tion system which can solve the Alternative Uses Test
The Alternative Uses Test: The Alternative Uses Test [6]
takes the following form: participants are given the name of
an object item (e.g. Brick), and asked to come up with as
many different uses as they can for that item, in a set amount
of time (this amount varies from an empirical investigation
to another - generally between 1 min and 3 min). Then, the
participants proceed on doing the same with the next item,
etc. The evaluation of the Alternative Uses Test is done on
Fluency, Flexibility and Originality or Novelty.
Normative data for the Alternative Uses Test can be easily
obtained in relation to a set of objects, for example objects
from the household domain. Such data should include human
Fluency, Flexibility and Originality or Novelty, as well as order
of responses - which might later be useful in understanding
the types of creative processes employed to generate the
alternative uses.
Evaluations on the same types of metrics as for human
answers can be made for the artiﬁcial cognitive system (on
Fluency, Flexibility and Originality or Novelty). Furthermore,
the processes employed by the system can be compared to
those employed by humans, as observed in think aloud proto-
cols [46]. If normative order of responses has been obtained,
then an analysis can be performed on the inﬂuence various
object features have over coming up with new uses.
Description of the knowledge acquisition for the artiﬁcial
cognitive system solver: An Object Replacement Object Com-
position (OROC) system was deemed able to give similar
answers as humans to the Alternative Uses Test [34].
OROC had a knowledge base of 70 simple and 20 composed
objects. These objects are described through their various fea-
tures (name, material, shape, affordance, size). Their features
were manually encoded from descriptions of the object, and
considered common sense knowledge. OROC makes creative
inferences in a cognitively-inspired process – determining
similarity of affordance based on similarity of other features –
e.g. if object a has affordance affa, than objects b and c can
be proposed as having the same affordances or being suitable
replacements if they have similar (functional) properties.
Description of evaluation with human data: Five objects
were selected from a household items domain on which
OROC was to deploy its creative inference of affordance.
These objects were: Cup, Newspaper, Toothbrush, Carpet,
Dental F loss. Thus, for an object like Cup, OROC could
come up with creative inferences about its affordances, e.g. A
cup can be used for putting ﬂowers in (based on its similarity
of shape with known object V ase).
The ﬂuency and ﬂexibility of OROC’s answers to these ﬁve
objects – a total of 30 alternative object use statements – was
assessed in the same manner in which the answer would have
been assessed if provided by humans which were undergoing
the Alternative Uses Test. Human judges were then employed
to assess Novelty, Usefulness and Likability on a 1-7 Likert
scale, where 1 represented the lower bound, for example ‘Not
at all novel’, and 7 the upper bound, e.g. ‘Highly novel’.
Usefulness and Likability were new metrics added in this
assessment besides the normally used Novelty metric. These
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were meant to split the feedback from the judges in different
dimensions, and thus dispel possible inﬂuences between how
much a judge liked a particular use and how much they found
it to be useful or novel.
Human judges were not informed that they were assessing
the creative answers of an artiﬁcial system. The most novel,
useful and likable items were thus classiﬁed – for example, the
alternative use response judged as demonstrating most novelty
was Dental ﬂoss may be used to hang clothes to dry. After
evaluation, the system demonstrated similar ratings as those
obtained by answers given by human participants. The answers
provided by OROC were rated as follows: mean Novelty 3.79
(SD = 1.69), mean Likability 3.31 (SD = 1.68), mean
Usefulness 3.77 (SD = 1.7). Human answers from Gilhooly
et al. [46] are rated only for Novelty: 2.54 (SD = 0.74)
in a think aloud group and 2.45 (SD = 0.51) in a silent
group respectively. As a side result, a correlation between
ratings on Usefulness and Likability was observed in human
judges: r = 0.63, p < 0.005. Note that, when asked to provide
their ratings on Novelty, Usefulness and Likability, the judges
were not provided with speciﬁc deﬁnitions, thus they were
guided by their own subjective deﬁnition of these dimensions,
making this evaluation procedure similar to the consensual
assessment technique [47], in which independent individuals
make subjective judgements on products in domains they
are familiar with. As deﬁnitions of these dimensions are not
a priori provided, creativity assessments are more likely to
mirror assessments in the real world, a more accurate measure
of interjudge reliability is obtained and the deﬁnitions of the
experimenter are not imposed onto the judges.
OROC’s processes of proposing new object affordances
were also assessed and showed comparability to the cognitive
processes deployed by humans when solving the Alternative
Uses Test, as explored by a think aloud protocol by [46]. More
importantly, these forms of evaluation demonstrated (i) the
ability to apply similar techniques in assessing creative solving
of human and artiﬁcial cognitive systems, and (ii) compara-
bility of process which can be used for further empirical and
computational investigations.
It is worth noting that OROC was not implemented with the
Alternative Uses Test in mind, but for testing a mechanism
from a cognitive creative problem solving theoretical frame-
work [48], [32]. This mechanism had the general purpose of
being able to replace object a with an object b with similar
functionality, for cases when object a was in its knowledge
base, but not in the environment. Part of OROC’s abilities,
like that of composing new objects, remain presently untested
via comparison to a human creativity task counterpart.
V. GENERAL APPROACH
A general approach can be formulated, based on the above
examples, for producing artiﬁcial cognitive systems that can
yield comparable results to humans in creativity tests, and aim
for cognitive or cognitively-inspired processes and cognitive
knowledge acquisition. This approach involves several steps:
1) Choosing a human creativity test, the results of which
are to be replicated via a cognitive system, or choosing
a creative problem-solving skill that is more general and
has some empirical adjacent validation possible.
2) Finding a source of knowledge for cognitive knowledge
acquisition, or gathering such knowledge from human
participants.
3) Implementing a system which uses processes similar to
(or is able to produce results similar to) cognitive cre-
ative processes, like association, re-representation, use
of context, structure and similarity, etc. Implementing
types of knowledge organization which are cognitively
inspired, or which might yield further cognitive results.
4) Finding or obtaining human normative data for that
particular test or general task.
5) Evaluating the results of the artiﬁcial cognitive system
using: a) human normative data and/or b) evaluation
techniques used for assessing the human creativity task.
Supplementary, computational creativity evaluation pro-
cedures can also be applied.
6) Deploying data analysis measures which enable new
possible relations of scientiﬁc interest to be observed.
Such measures can be deployed on computational data,
on empirical data and on the computational-empirical
comparison.
7) Enabling the artiﬁcial cognitive system with generative
abilities for that particular test or task (if possible) -
i.e. with the possibility of not only solving a particular
creative or creative problem-solving task, but also with
the ability of creating more tasks of this type. This will
allow for new empirical testing of human participants
with controlled variables, to further reﬁne hypotheses
about creative processes.
This approach and its essential steps are shown in Fig.1.
Fig. 1. General approach steps
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VI. APPLICABILITY OF THESE PRINCIPLES TO OTHER
CREATIVITY TESTS
In this section, the Wallach-Kogan instances test [8] and
insight tests [9], [10] are proposed as two other possible
creativity tests on which this approach could be applied.
Sections VI-A and VI-B describe these tests and particularities
of applying this approach to implementing artiﬁcial cognitive
systems for each of them. Table I gives an overview of the
application of the general approach to the previously men-
tioned case studies (IV-A, IV-B), and to the other two proposed
creativity tests (VI-A, VI-B) and corresponding skills.
A. The Wallach-Kogan instances test
The Wallach-Kogan instances test [8] gives participants a
speciﬁc property or component, and requires them to enumer-
ate as many items as they can which have that property or
contain that component (e.g. items that are green, that make
noise, that have wheels, etc.).
As shown in the fourth column of Table I, data can be ac-
quired by giving the Wallach-Kogan test to human participants,
with stimuli consisting of sets of oftenly encountered prop-
erties and object parts. Thus, normative data for Flexibility,
Fluency and Originality of answers can be gathered. Human
judges can be used for Novelty and Elaboration ratings.
Cognitive knowledge acquisition can be performed by either
a) asking human participants to describe objects in terms of
their deﬁning properties and components, or b) by machine
learning approaches directed at acquiring such property-object
or component-object co-ocurrences from text corpora.
A computational cognitive agent that solves the Wallach-
Kogan instances test could also be developed to have gener-
ative abilities, thus to create queries based on controlling for
the frequency of relations between properties (or components)
and objects. Giving human participants queries in which the
frequency of object–properties and object–components relation
is controlled would help us investigate (i) whether the speed
of processes like property based search and component based
search of objects is the same or not; (ii) whether different
types of features-based queries are easier or harder than
others; (iii) whether the number of components in the object
inﬂuences performance, etc. This in turn will help us build
more cognitively-informed creative problem-solving agents.
B. Insight tests
Insight tests, like the ones by Maier [9] and Duncker [10]
require a larger amount of knowledge and heuristics in order
to be successfully solved and implemented. Addressing insight
tests that require object knowledge before those which require
abstract knowledge might be a productive scalable strategy.
Such a strategy could for example employ data on objects and
features that has been obtained for the Alternative Uses Test,
or the Wallach-Kogan test.
Object affordances are required for solving practical insight
tests as well. Tasks can be given over crowdsourcing platforms
to acquire affordances of sets of commonly used objects. Data
mining strategies can be used to extract, from text corpora, sets
of objects, paired with the verbs that are used in conjunction
with them – a subset of which will constitute the object’s af-
fordances. It is sensible to consider that at least a subset of the
problem templates that pertain to objects will be constructed
from such affordances. This knowledge can be complemented
with the acquisition of object-related problem templates and
common heuristics employed by human participants when
approaching practical object insight tests. Such acquisition
might require the analysis of think-aloud protocol data of
human participants solving insight problems.
Normative data on object insight tests can be acquired from
existing sources [49], or via meta-analysis on existing results
on different tests. Such meta-analysis might be necessary
because insight tests generally require a large amount of time
to be deployed, thus the empirical data from one source is
most often restricted to only a few insight tests, or even to
one.
Among the multiple comparison and evaluation tools that
can be employed, one of the most interesting ones is that
of comparing the use, switch between, and creation of new
problem-templates. An artiﬁcial cognitive agent performing
such tasks of re-representation would undoubtebly prove of
much interest for advancing the state of the art on creative
reasoning techniques.
Generative abilities in a system which can solve insight
problems, even in a restricted domain, would provide a reliable
way to create and modify a larger set of insight problems.
VII. COGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION FROM
CREATIVITY TESTS
Some human creativity tests can be used to provide knowl-
edge bases for artiﬁcial cognitive systems. For example, the
Wallach-Kogan test will yield a set of data pertaining to object
properties and object parts, as for each property or object part
various objects having that property or that object part are
asked for from the participant.
These answers can be used in the knowledge base of
artiﬁcial systems, in the context of other tests – like the
Alternative Uses Test – where various properties are required
to be known by the system, or the object insight tests, in which
properties might be relevant for future affordances in solving
object tasks.
Furthermore, common answers in the Wallach-Kogan test
can be considered as high-frequency associates, and models
can be built to interpret the frequency of occuring answers
in the Wallach-Kogan test or their ordering as weights of
associative links.
Similarly, giving human participants a set of object-related
insight problems using the think aloud protocol will provide
knowledge on problem templates used (even if some of
them are not productive for that particular problem), from
which observations can be made on how such templates are
constructed.
VIII. DISCUSSION
As shown in the previous case studies (Sections IV-A
and IV-B), this approach is useful from both an Artiﬁcial
Intelligence and a cognitive science perspective.
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TABLE I
SHOWING APPLICATION OF THE COMPARABILITY APPROACH TO VARIOUS CREATIVITY TESTS AND TASKS
Approach A. RAT solver B. AUT solver C. Wallach-Kogan solver D. Insight tests solver
1. Human creativity test or
ability
The Remote Associates
Test [5]
The Alternative Uses test
[6]
Wallach-Kogan instances
test [8]
Insights tests[9], [10]
2. Normative data 144 queries from Bowden
and Jung-Beeman [43]
can be obtained for a pre-
deﬁned set of objects
can be obtained for a pre-
deﬁned set of properties
and/or components
can be obtained by meta-
analysis of insight tests pa-
pers or by new empirical
experimentation
3. Source for cognitive
knowledge acquisition
2-grams from language
corpuses, word associates,
ontologies
requires object, object
parts and feature parts
knowledge
requires object and
features knowledge,
affordance knowledge
object knowledge, prob-
lem templates and heuris-
tics knowledge
4. System implementation;
cognitive processes, cogni-
tive knowledge organiza-
tion/representation
association based search,
convergence (as explained
in [35])
affordances, similarity-
based association, structure
(transfer), shape bias
similarity-based
association, common
parts/structure, feature
based search
re-representation, creation
of new problem templates,
creation of new heuristics.
5. Evaluation ability to answer the same
queries as humans, compa-
rability to human norma-
tive data
comparison to human an-
swers to the Alternative
Uses Test obtained by
Gilhooly et al [46], Flu-
ency, Flexibility, Novelty,
Originality metrics
Fluency, Flexibility, Nov-
elty, Originality metrics;
comparison to order of an-
swers as produced by hu-
mans
comparability to humans
in think aloud protocols,
the use/creation of similar
problem templates, knowl-
edge and processes, switch
between templates, escape
from functional ﬁxedness
6. Data analysis and
human-system comparison
relation to human response
times, query difﬁculty, an-
swer preference
analysis of different fea-
tures as driving human re-
sponses via similarity -
to be compared with such
features in the system, the
Novelty - Usefulness re-
lation between alternative
uses answers
relationships between fea-
ture access and compo-
nent access speed, between
speed of access and fre-
quency of property (in
human answers), between
Fluency and Novelty rat-
ings, etc.
problem templates regu-
larly employed, number of
associated objects, their re-
lation to response times,
etc.
7. Generative abilities control over frequency,
item presentation order
control over various types
of feature inﬂuence in pro-
ducing alternative uses
can be used to control
for frequency of objects-
properties or objects-
components relations
control over variables like
problem templates used or
heuristics triggered, ob-
jects, features
From the AI perspective, new techniques can be developed
out of the inspiration of human creative cognitive processing.
From the cognitive science perspective, these systems can
further be used by cognitive psychologists for the more de-
tailed cognitive modeling of creative tasks, the implementation
and testing of various theoretical hypotheses on how creative
processes unfold and how knowledge organization sustains
such processes.
New relations can be observed during the implementation
of systems capable of comparable results in data analysis, like
the correlation between the probability of ﬁnding an answer
and the difﬁculty of query for the (RAT, comRAT) test–system
pair, or the relationship between Usefulness and Likability in
the Alternative Uses Test.
In order to bridge the gap between computational creativity
and empirical research on human creativity, we must aim to
address not only artefact creating systems, but also problem-
solving and creative reasoning systems, and systems which can
give answers comparable to humans in creativity tests. This
will allow the further study of the creative process, in both
artiﬁcial and natural cognitive systems. Steps towards bridging
this gap should involve (i) the use of cognitive processes and
types of knowledge organization as an inspiration to some
computational creativity systems; (ii) the use of computational
creativity systems which have been tightly inspired by cogni-
tive processes as potential models or tools to investigate human
creativity processes; (iii) the use of cognitive knowledge
acquisition techniques to inform the knowledge bases of such
systems; (iv) making results of some computational creativity
systems and human creativity tasks directly comparable; this
includes both comparing the results of systems (which can act
as models) to human normative data, and the evaluation of
computational creativity answers through techniques reserved
for human participants; (v) the use of cognitive computational
systems and models to generate rich new sets of controlled
queries, which allow a deeper investigation of the human
creative problem solving process.
In conclusion, this paper has presented a general approach
to building cognitive computational creativity systems which
can give comparable answers to humans when solving human
creativity tests. A set of steps was laid down as possible
methodology when approaching such systems. The application
of these steps to various creativity tests was brieﬂy explored
and two case studies of systems which realize this approach
were presented. As further work we plan to (i) implement and
test this approach on the new cases described, and (ii) explore
the applications of this approach to assistive systems - thus
obtaining a deeper understanding of how natural cognitive
systems can beneﬁt and learn from the input of artiﬁcial
creative cognitive systems.
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